Abstract. A public key cryptosystem based on Drinfeld modules has been proposed by Gillard, Leprevost, Panchishkin and Roblot. This paper shows how an adversary can directly recover a private key using only the public key, and so the cryptosystem is insecure.
Introduction
In 2003 Gillard, Leprevost, Panchishkin and Roblot [2] proposed a cryptosystem based on Drinfeld modules. We refer to this cryptosystem as the GLPR cryptosystem. We aim to show that this cryptosystem is insecure, by showing how an adversary with access to just the public key can recover a corresponding private key.
The original proposal in [2] used the language of Drinfeld modules.
Our main contribution is to translate the scheme into a more elementary This author was supported by EPSRC Grant GR/S42637. algebraic language. The scheme is then seen to be an instance of a multivariate cryptosystem. It is therefore natural to attack the scheme using methods such as those in [3] . Our conclusion is that the title of a paper by Scanlon [4] remains correct.
The paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 describes the GLPR trapdoor one-way function, avoiding the use of Drinfeld module terminology. This description makes use of two linear maps λ 1 and λ 2 that Gillard et al [2] define using Drinfeld modules. Section 3 explores the definition of λ 1 and λ 2 in more detail, and shows that these linear maps have indeed the form of equation (2), which we use in our cryptanalysis. Section 3 is the only section that uses Drinfeld modules explicitly. Finally, Section 4 describes our attack on the GLPR scheme.
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The GLPR Cryptosystem
Let p be a prime and let d and e be integers. The values suggested in [2] are p ≈ 2 32 , d = 5 or d = 6 and e = 5 or e = 7. The GLPR trapdoor oneway function ψ maps F p d to F p d . This function is specified by selecting an element δ ∈ F p d and two bijective F p -linear maps
The function is then defined by
It is well known that the linear maps λ 1 and λ 2 may be written in the
where F is the p-power Frobenius map on F p d and where the coefficients
The public key of the system will be the prime p, the integer d
and certain information about how to compute ψ. The private key or trapdoor consists of the transformations λ 1 , λ 2 and the values e and δ.
Note that if λ 1 , λ 2 , e and δ are all known, it is easy to compute the inverse of ψ. The particular structure of the maps λ i means that, if e is small, it is possible to give a compact description of how to compute the function ψ(z), without explicitly describing λ 1 , λ 2 , e or δ. We refer to the original paper [2] for details; for our purposes it is sufficient to know the fact (obvious, since the GLPR proposal is a public key cryptosystem)
that the image of any element in F p d under ψ can easily be computed from the public key.
We note that the public key does not determine the private key uniquely: for any non-zero b ∈ F p d and any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} the private key
gives the same function ψ as the private key (λ 1 , λ 2 , e, δ). Any of these solutions can be used as a trapdoor for the function ψ. 
Drinfeld modules
The mappings λ 1 and λ 2 of the previous section were originally defined using the language of Drinfeld modules [2] . This section recaps this definition, so that it can be seen that λ 1 and λ 2 really do have the form (2).
Let p be a prime number. We denote by A the ring F p [T ] of polynomials in a variable T with coefficients in F p . We write A{τ } for the ring defined as follows. The set of elements of A{τ } is the set of polynomials in τ with coefficients in A. Addition in A{τ } is the usual addition for polynomials. However, multiplication in A{τ } is 'twisted' by using the rule τ k × a = a p k τ k for all a ∈ A and all positive integers k.
Thus A naturally has the structure of a (left) A{τ }-module, where for
In other words, the elements of A ⊆ A{τ } act by left multiplication, and τ acts as the Frobenius map.
A Drinfeld module is simply an F p -algebra morphism ϕ : A → A{τ }, with the property that ϕ(T ) is a polynomial in τ of degree at least 1 whose constant term is T . 
An attack on the scheme
We show how to recover a private key from the public key.
The first step of the attack is to guess e. The original paper suggests either e = 5 or e = 7, and in any case e must be small, so we can simply run the attack on each possible value of e in turn. Now, using the public key we can generate many pairs (z, w) where w = ψ(z)
for random values of z ∈ F p d . In fact, our attack needs just e+d−1 e +d+1 such pairs.
The main point of the attack is to recover the two linear maps λ (2).
We use 2d unknowns in F p d . Write
where the x i and y j are treated as unknowns in F p d . To be precise, for any given element z ∈ F p d , the value of λ 2 (z) is given by the linear equation
and similarly for λ −1 1 (w). We also introduce a variable δ, which replaces the private value of δ. Now, each pair (z, w) gives rise to a relation
Since z and w are exact field elements, each of these relations gives rise to a large multivariate polynomial relation in the 2d + 1 variables x i , y j and δ. Note that these polynomials are linear in the variables x i and δ.
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Moreover, all monomials involving the variables y j are homogeneous of degree e, and do not involve the variables x i and δ.
So we obtain a number of multivariate polynomial relations of degree e between the 2d + 1 variables. It remains to find an F p d -solution to this polynomial system. Although it is certainly possible to apply standard
Gröbner basis techniques, we suggest using linearisation methods to solve this system (see, for example, [3, 1] ), as they have proved to be quite effective against multivariate schemes. We have successfully implemented this approach using the computer algebra package Magma [5] . The attack is described as follows.
We first linearise, by replacing each non-linear monomial j y Finally, once one obtains λ −1 1 and λ 2 it is trivial to recover λ 1 and the private key is completely known to the adversary.
In our experiments with a 32-bit prime and d = e = 5 we recovered the private key in under 10 sec on a 3 GHz Pentium 4 machine.
